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I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance is not a typical business.' Unlike most businesses, it
affects the public interest, in large part because people purchase it to
protect their families and themselves at their moments of greatest vulnera-
bility. Thus, the quality of the insurance product and the way in which it
is sold has been, and continues to be, regulated at common law.
Increasingly, courts are being asked to void these historic consumer
protections by applying the "filed rate doctrine" 2 to bar damage claims
in insurance cases. Essentially, the filed rate doctrine prevents recourse
by those alleging unfair pricing on the basis of properly established and
filed rates. 3 Some have attempted to import this doctrine into the insur-
ance context, thus cutting off claims based on properly filed insurance
rates. As more and more insurance companies attempt to escape liability
in tort or contract by invoking the filed rate doctrine, 4 the need for care-
ful analysis of the appropriate forms and limits of this doctrine grows.
Generally, efforts to use the filed rate doctrine in the insurance
context have been unsuccessful, since its doctrinal foundations make
little sense in the insurance context. Therefore, the overwhelming
majority of federal and state courts, including North Dakota's, have
never applied the filed rate doctrine to insurance. 5
Initially, the filed rate doctrine was created to preserve the rate-
making procedures of the Interstate Commerce Commission and to pre-
vent interstate carriers from engaging in price discrimination. 6 Later, the
doctrine was applied to telecommunications 7 and utilities 8 to prevent
1. See, e.g., German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 411 (1914); Bekken v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 293 N.W. 200, 210 (N.D. 1940).
2. The filed rate doctrine, also known as the "Keogh doctrine," is a judicially created concept
which originated in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwest Railway, 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Hanson v. Acceleration Life Ins. Co., No. A3-97-152 (D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999)
(Webb, C.J.), available at <http://www.ndd.uscourts.gov/dndopinions/html/A3_97_152_118. htm>.
5. The only North Dakota case on the filed rate doctrine is E.W. Wylie Corp. v. Menard, 523
N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 1994), in which the North Dakota Supreme Court refused to apply the filed rate
doctrine to permit a shipper to collect freight charges against a consignor who had already paid a
consignee for the shipping charges.
6. When it became effective on January 1, 1996, the ICC Termination Act of 1995 abolished the
ICC; however, the Act also transferred most of the Commission's functions to a new agency, within
the Department of Transportation, called the Surface Transportation Board. See ICC Termination Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 932, 932-43 (1995). The Act has also removed most of the
previous filing requirements and unreasonable discrimination prohibitions with respect to motor
carriers, but it has left them in place for rail and pipeline carriers. See id.
7. See generally American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Central Office Tel. Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998).
8. See generally Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981). However, the filed rate doc-
trine has not been applied in two recent electric utility rate cases. See, e.g., Columbia Steel Casting
Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co.. 103 F.3d 1446 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of rehearing, 111
F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1997); Florida Mun. Power Agency v. Florida Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 614 (11 th
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regulated entities from charging rates for services other than the filed
rates. 9 However, not all regulated industries automatically warrant appli-
cation of the filed rate doctrine. Courts that have reviewed the applica-
bility of the filed rate doctrine to new fields have focused on one or
more of the following factors:
(1) The impact the court's decision will have on agency
procedures and rate determinations;10
(2) Whether there is an administrative agency to review the
claim and provide a remedy;"l
(3) Whether there is meaningful review of rate increases; 12 and
(4) Whether the damages are based upon the difference
between the filed rate and the rate that would have been
charged absent some alleged wrongdoing.13
Until recently, there had been no North Dakota jurisprudence indi-
cating whether the filed rate doctrine would apply to bar fraud-based
claims in the field of insurance. In Hanson v. Acceleration Life Insur-
ance Co. (hereinafter "Hanson"),14 Chief Judge for the Federal District
of North Dakota Rodney Webb determined that, under applicable state
law,15 the filed rate doctrine does not apply to the business of long-term
Cir. 1995). Based on the expansion of energy deregulation, the filed rated doctrine will likely be
limited in future utility cases.
9. The Second Circuit recently stated that the filed rate doctrine is "plainly a creature of a differ-
ent time" that should not be strictly applied in an era of deregulation and competing carriers. See Fax
Telecomm. Inc. v. AT&T, 138 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 1998). The cases which apply the filed rate doctrine
to various regulated industries support the analysis here, since all of those regulatory schemes are both
more comprehensive than North Dakota's insurance scheme and provide administrative remedies to
aggrieved parties.
10. See generally H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. Inc., 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992).
11. See generally Calico Trailer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 155 F.3d 976 (8th
Cir. 1998).
12. See generally Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., Inc., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).
13. See H. J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 488.
14. No. A3-97-152 (D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999); available at <http://www.ndd.uscourts.govl
dndopinions/htmI/A3_97_ 152_I 18.htm>.
15. Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, "the law to be applied in any [diversity] case is the
law of the state." Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1939). The Eighth Circuit, discussing
applicable law, stated as follows:
The substantive issues in this case are governed by law of the State. of Nebraska, the
state in which the district court sits, because jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizen-
ship. In determining the law of the State of Nebraska, we are bound by the decisions of
the Nebraska Supreme Court. If the Nebraska Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue, we must determine what that court would probably hold were it to decide the issue.
In making this determination, we may consider relevant state precedent, analogous
decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works and any other reliable data.
Farr v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 61 F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). It is not the
role of a federal court to expand the existing scope of state law. See generally Burris Chem., Inc. v.
USX Corp., 10 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 1993) (explaining that, under Erie, federal courts sitting in diversity
rule upon state law as it exists and do not surmise or suggest its expansion). Nor is it the role of the
court to choose a rule of law that it believes is better or that it would adopt for itself. Id. The sole
function of a federal court sitting in diversity is to determine the issue under state law as the state's
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care insurance in North Dakota. 16 The decision properly weighed each
of the above-mentioned issues against the facts of the case and the
specific regulatory regime applicable to long-term care insurance in
North Dakota.17 According to the Hanson court, North Dakota's
statutory scheme contains no requirement that the filed rate doctrine be
applied, and the court found North Dakota's statutory language to be
inconsistent with the doctrine's application.' 8
This Article will examine the inherent conflict in the application of
the filed rate doctrine to fraud-based insurance claims in North Dakota
in light of North Dakota's insurance regulations. Throughout, the
analysis will use the recent Hanson case as a case study.19
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF HANSON
The Hanson class action arose because over 2000 of North Dako-
ta's senior citizens purchased long-term care or nursing care ("LTC")
insurance policies from Acceleration Life Insurance Company ("Accel-
eration") and its licensed agents (collectively referred to as "defen-
dants") between 1984 and 1990.20 LTC is only one of a number of
"over-age" insurance products, which also include medical supplement,
major medical, and hospital indemnification policies, that were sold,
generally in tandem, by defendants to the plaintiff class and renewed
annually thereafter by plaintiffs. 21
Under the terms of the subject LTC policies (Forms 520, 521 and
522), as long as the insureds paid the premium, the policy was guaran-
teed renewable each year.22 According to section 45-06-05-04(1)(b) of
the North Dakota Administrative Code:
The term "guaranteed renewable" may be used only when the
insured has the right to continue the long-term care insurance
in force by the timely payment of premiums and when the in-
surer has no unilateral right to make any change in any pro-
vision of the policy or rider while the insurance is in force, and
cannot decline to renew, except that rates may be revised by the
insurer on a class basis.23
highest court would determine it. Id.
16. Hanson v. Accelerated Life Ins. Co., No. A3-97-152, at *3 (D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999), availa-
ble at <http:/www.ndd.uscourts.gov/dndopinions.html/A3_97_152_1 18.htm>.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See generally id.
20. Id. at * 1, *6. Allan Kanner served as lead counsel for the plaintiffs in Hanson v. Accelera-
tion Life Insurance Co., No. A3-97-152 (D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999).
21. Id. at **1-2.
22. Id. at *1.
23. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 45-06-05-04(1)(b) (1994).
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Defendants admitted in the actuarial memorandum underlying these
policies that the policies were supposed to be "level premium" policies;
that is, the premium would remain constant for every year that the policy
was renewed. 24 However, the policies contained a provision which read
as follows:
PREMIUM RATES-CHANGES
We may change the premium rates. A change will apply to all
contracts with the same form number as your's which are in
force in the state you live in. A change will apply on the next
due date after we give you at least a 30-day written notice at
your last known address.25
The plaintiffs charged that the Hanson defendants used this language,
especially the phrase "We may change the premium rates," to justify the
exorbitant rate increases that led to the lawsuit.26 As discussed below, the
LTC policies at issue in Hanson operated in fact as rising premium
policies, caused in part by an escalating "death spiral." 27 The Hanson
plaintiffs contended that such a policy was indisputably inappropriate
for elderly people on fixed incomes, because LTC insurance is worthless
unless the insured can afford to keep it until it is needed. 28
A core element of the Hanson plaintiffs' complaint was that the
LTC policies were sold as coverage that customers could realistically
maintain for the rest of their lives or until needed. 29 This required the
policies to have essentially level premiums.3 0 The Hanson plaintiffs also
claimed that the defendants knew at the time of sale and renewal that the
policy premiums would increase dramatically to unaffordable levels and
that the defendants not only intentionally withheld this information from
new customers and renewal customers but affirmatively and falsely told
customers in form renewal letters that these policies were "competitive"
and "one of the best policies available in your state." 31 Likewise, the
24. Hanson, No. A3-97-152, at *2. Level premiums are actuarily possible because, unlike many
true health policies, the benefits under such policies are capped. In a properly designed level
premium policy, the policies are rated such that the premiums paid in the first years of the policy are in
excess of what is needed to pay the commissions, administrative costs, and claims, so that there will be
remaining funds to invest. As the pool grows older and claims increase, the premiums paid are less
than the yearly cost of running the block. However, the pool is supported by the current premiums as
well as the accumulated earnings from the premiums paid in the first years. See generally Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Support of Motion of Partial Summary Judgment at 3 n.5, Hanson v. Acceleration
Life Ins. Co., No. A3-97-152 (D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Memorandum].
25. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 4 (policy on file with author).
26. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 24, at 4 (policy on file with author).
27. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 3-5 (policy on file with author).
28. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 3 n.7.
29. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 4.
30. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 4.
31. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 4.
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risk of rate increases and future unaffordability of the policies was not
addressed in the brochure given to the plaintiffs at the time of
application or when the insureds wrote their first premium check. 32
Instead, when the policy arrived, it stated that premiums "may" increase,
omitting the fact that rate increases were planned and inevitable. 33 The
policies also stated that they were "guaranteed renewable for life,"
suggesting falsely that they would be affordable for life. 34
Due to the fact that premiums rose over 700% between 1989 and
1996, less than 200 North Dakota citizens were paying the annual
premium on these policies at the time of the Hanson litigation. 35 Such
an increase is without precedent. 36 According to the North Dakota
Department of Insurance ("NDI"), this was the worst LTC policy sold in
North Dakota. 37 Those who were still paying the premiums did so
because they were trapped and were too old to switch coverage. 38
Essentially, the Hanson plaintiffs claimed the LTC policies pur-
chased by North Dakota citizens were defective products.39 In addition,
they claimed that the facts underlying these defects were fraudulently
withheld from the plaintiff class to enable defendants to continue to sell,
and annually renew, these policies.40 In response to these allegations, the
Hanson defendants argued plaintiffs' claims were barred by the filed
rate doctrine.
The facts and circumstances revealed during discovery and dis-
cussed immediately below explain why this occurred. These facts and
circumstances emphasize the ease with which insurance companies doing
business in less regulated environments can manipulate insurance
regulations and underscore the importance of Judge Webb's ruling that
the filed rate doctrine should not apply under North Dakota's current
insurance regulatory scheme.
32. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 24, at 4.
33. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 24, at 4.
34. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 4.
35. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 5.
36. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 5.
37. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 24, at 5 n.12.
38. Plaintiff s Memorandum, supra note 24, at 5 n.12. In 1995, the average age of the class was
83. By now, many class members are over the age of 85 and are unable to obtain an LTC policy.
Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 5 n. 12.
39. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 5 n.12. In order for a level premium policy to
meet its intended purpose, it must be priced in a manner which accounts for the age of the policy hold-
ers, it must be underwritten in a way to avoid high risks or excessive, early claims, and the premiums
paid by the customers must be reserved and managed properly in order to pay claims throughout the
years. If the policy is priced correctly and the premiums remain level, both healthy risks and un-
healthy risks will remain in the pool, thus providing continuing premiums to help support the block as a
whole and keep the loss-ratio to a minimum. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 24, at 5 n.14.
40. Plaintiff s Memorandum, supra note 24, at 6.
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III. ANALYSIS
With the Hanson case providing a factual background, the following
sections examine the filed rate doctrine in light of North Dakota's
insurance regulatory scheme.
A. APPLICATION OF THE FOUR FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION
In determining whether to apply the filed rate doctrine in new areas,
such as the insurance field, courts examine four factors to guide their
analysis. 4 1
1. Impact on Regulating Agency
The Eighth Circuit in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 4 2
ruled that "the focus for determining whether the filed rate doctrine
applies is the impact the court's decision will have on agency procedures
and rate determinations." 43 In H.J. Inc., the court held that class mem-
bers' RICO claims, alleging that Northwestern Bell bribed members of
the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission in connection with proposed
increases of telephone rates, were barred by the filed rate doctrine.4 4
The court recognized that the purpose of the filed rate doctrine was to
"preserve the regulating agency's authority to determine the reasonable-
ness of rates" and that "the relief sought would disturb uniform rates
and the Commission's rate-making decisions." 45 The Eighth Circuit
went on to explain that granting the relief requested by the class would
challenge the previous action of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commis-
sion, which had implemented a rate decrease during the appeal. 46
The North Dakota Department of Insurance ("NDI") is not vested
with great regulatory authority concerning rate setting and rate increases.
Under North Dakota's insurance regulatory scheme, benefits under
long-term care insurance policies are deemed to be reasonable in
relation to premiums provided the expected loss ratio is at least sixty
percent.47 Although section 26.1-30-19 of the North Dakota Century
Code requires all insurance policies or rate schedules issued in the state
41. See, e.g., Calico Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 155 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 1998);
Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 954
F.2d 485 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992).
42. 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1992).
43. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 489 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S.
957 (1992).
44. Id. at 486.
45. Id. at 488, 493.
46. Id. at 493.
47. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 45-06-05-08 (1994).
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to be filed and approved by the commissioner, section 26.1-30-21 of the
North Dakota Century Code provides the commissioner with little en-
forcement authority following disapproval. 48 Moreover, North Dakota's
insurance regulations do not contain provisions for consumers to air
their complaints regarding rate increases. Instead, the regulations only
provide hearings for insurance companies when their requested rate
increases are denied. 49
A comparison of the North Dakota Public Service Commission's
("PSC") authority with the NDI's authority underscores this point.5 0
The ratemaking authority of the PSC is set forth at sections 49-02-03
and 49-02-02(5) of the North Dakota Century Code.51 These statutes
specifically grant the PSC the power, after notice and hearing, to "origi-
nate, establish, modify, adjust, promulgate, and enforce tariffs, rates, joint
rates and charges of all public utilities."5 2 This broad power in setting
utilities rates is tempered, however, by the requirement that notice be
provided and a hearing be held prior to the approval of any rate or rate
increase. 53 In Aggie Investments v. Public Service Commission,54 the
North Dakota Supreme Court specifically held that section 49-02-02(5)
required that a hearing be held before the PSC could enter into a settle-
ment establishing a rate with a utility.5 5 The Aggie II court noted that
"[t]he powers and duties of the PSC must be exercised in accordance
with the statutory provisions granting these powers," and it held that the
PSC settlement of a rate increase without a hearing violated the hearing
requirement in section 49-02-02(5) of the North Dakota Century
Code.56
A complete description of the various steps in the PSC's procedure
for handling rate increase applications can be found in a PSC publica-
tion entitled Procedure in Major Rate Cases Before the Public Service
Commission.5 7 The procedure mandated for the PSC by statute and
administrative rule provides several opportunities for consumers to be
involved in the PSC's determination of rate increases.
48. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-30-19, 26.1-30-21 (1995).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-30-21.
50. Typically, the filed rate doctrine is applied only to regulated entities, such as utilities. How-
ever, the North Dakota Supreme Court has chosen not to apply the doctrine under all such circumstanc-
es. See O'Connor v. Northern States Power Co., 308 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1981); see also discussion
infra Part III.D.
51. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 49-02-02(5), 49-02-03 (1999).
52. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-03.
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-02(5).
54. Aggie Investments v. Public Serv. Comm'n ("Aggie Ir'), 470 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1991).
55. Aggie I, 470 N.W.2d at 809 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-02(5)).
56. Id. at 811 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-02(5)).
57. NoRi DAKOTA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, PROCEDURE IN MAJOR RATE CASES BEFORE THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION (on file with author).
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First, the utility's application for a rate increase must contain a sec-
tion detailing the impact of the proposed rate increase on consumers.
Second, public notice is given of the utility's request for rate increases.5 8
Third, public input sessions are held throughout the state for consumers
to voice their concerns and opposition to rate increases.5 9 Fourth, sec-
tion 69-02-02-05 of the North Dakota Administrative Code allows a
consumer to intervene and become a party to the proceeding if the con-
sumer has "a legal interest which may be substantially affected by the
proceeding; and the intervention would not unduly broaden the issues or
delay the proceedings." 60 Fifth, consumers are allowed to testify at the
technical hearing as well. Finally, an intervenor who disagrees with the
PSC's decision may appeal it to the district court and the North Dakota
Supreme Court, as was the case in the Aggie decisions.61
In stark contrast, the NDI's authority and procedures, as mandated
by statute and regulation for approving a LTC insurance premium rate
or premium rate increases, are much less comprehensive. They do not
allow NDI to initiate rates and provide for no involvement by consumers.
The Hanson court recognized this lack of authority as follows: "[T]he
statutory scheme provides no mechanism for meaningful review of rates
filed with the Insurance Commissioner or for public input in a rate deter-
mination, hearings or otherwise. Simply put, the North Dakota Insur-
ance Commissioner does not have the authority to establish long term
care insurance policy rates." 62 While the statutes and regulations require
the PSC to give public notice, hold several hearings for public input by
consumers, allow for intervention by interested third parties including
consumers, and provide for appeal by those third parties, no such protec-
tions exist in the context of the NDI determination of LTC premium
rates.
NDI likewise has little authority over rate increases. Vance Mag-
nuson, Senior Life and Health Rate and Forms Analyst for NDI, testified
during his Hanson deposition that while NDI has the right to approve or
disapprove a rate filing, if there is actuarial justification for a rate in-
crease, i.e., a sixty percent loss ratio, the insurance company will ultimate-
ly get its rate increase. 63 Insurance Commissioner Glenn Pomeroy has
58. Aggie 1, 451 N.W.2d at 141.
59. Aggie 11, 470 N.W.2d at 807.
60. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 69-02-02-05 (1992).
61. Aggie 11, 470 N.w.2d at 805; Aggie 1, 451 N.w.2d at 141.
62. Hanson v. Acceleration Life Ins. Co., No. A3-97-152, at *3 (D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999), availa-
ble at <http:/lwww.ndd.uscourts.gov/dndopinionslhtmllA3_97_152_1 18.htm>.
63. Deposition of Vance Magnuson, at 128 (Sept. 22, 1998).
A: I'll respond to the question, but I guess with a qualified-qualified yes, in that you
know, the Department has the right to approve or disapprove a rate filing or request the
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echoed this sentiment, saying that "[p]resent law doesn't allow the
Department any alternative other than to approve these increases." 64
Insurance companies, aware of North Dakota's lax insurance regu-
lations, often take advantage of the situation. For example, the policies
at issue in Hanson were priced to sell and were designed by a salesman
who had little actuarial knowledge. 65 Even one of the Hanson defen-
dants' own consultants, Mark Litow of Milliman & Robertson, acknowl-
edged that these policies were initially priced too 10w. 66 The Hanson
plaintiffs alleged that policies should have been priced to pay the
benefits promised without the need for further rate increases, i.e., level
premiums, which was how the NDI understood they would work. 67
Unfortunately, they were not properly priced, a fact customers were not
told.68 Instead, the Hanson defendants began instituting a series of rate
increases to cover the initial underpricing. Under North Dakota's
statutory scheme, as long as the insurance company could satisfy the
sixty percent loss ratio requirement, the NDI was obligated to approve
the rate increases.
Additionally, the Hanson plaintiffs asserted the defendants engaged
in bad underwriting, which also resulted in rate increases that the NDI
did not have the authority to prohibit. It was plaintiffs' position that the
Hanson defendants sold the policies to anyone who could sign a check,
including people with Alzheimer's disease. This is bad underwriting,
i.e., the actuarial assumptions for the policy dictated that people with
certain risks or preexisting conditions should not be sold the policy. 69 A
company accept and refile something lower. If there is actuarial justification for a rate
increase, the Department, no matter whether we disapprove that filing, or not, will
probably ultimately end up in a hearing where the company would substantiate that a rate
increase is necessary.
Q: Okay.
A: So the Department, I guess, has the option of either knowing that they're not going to
prevail in a hearing and let a previous disapproval go because it is substantiated.
Id.
64. Senate Industry, Business and Labor Committee on Senate Bill No. 2161, 54th Legis. 3 (North
Dakota 1995) (statement of Glenn Pomeroy, Insurance Commissioner). Commissioner Pomeroy furth-
er testified that:
State law requires the Insurance Department to approve premium increases that are
shown to be necessary to pay claims by the company... few companies, however, sold
this type of insurance eight or ten years ago and are now requiring astronomical rate
increase in order to pay the claims of those policyholders receiving nursing home care.
Id.
65. Johnny Smith, owner of Interstate Services Insurance Agency ("ISr'), developed the insur-
ance products along with a consulting actuary Paul Barnhart. See generally Deposition of Johnny
Smith (on file with author). Smith admitted in his Hanson deposition that he is "not an actuary, but I
know enough about it to be dangerous." Id. at 92.
66. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 6.
67. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 7.
68. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 7.
69. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 10. This point can be illustrated by considering the
contrast between insurance companies and public utilities. Utilities sell a product without discrimi
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policy that has competent underwriting from the outset will incur fewer
claims early on, which allows reserves to build up to cover later claims. 70
In Hanson, the exorbitant commissions of sixty percent the first year
(plus twenty percent for each of the next ten years), plus the fact that
many people claimed benefits almost immediately, prevented adequate
reserves from accumulating. Therefore, it was necessary to use current
premiums to pay current claims. 71 Thus, the poor initial pricing and
poor underwriting led the Hanson defendants to seek regular premium
increases. Since the NDI is effectively powerless to prevent such rate
increases, any decision by a court allowing fraud or misrepresentation
actions, or both, related to the sale and renewal of insurance policies,
such as in Hanson, will not interfere with NDI's regulating authority.72
2. Administrative Review and Remedies
In virtually all cases applying the filed rate doctrine, the plaintiff has
had other methods to recover damages under the regulatory scheme in
lieu of civil damages. 73 For example, consumers in H.J. Inc. received
refunds and decreases in telephone rates while the case was pending. 74
nation among buyers, and they do so at a fixed price. The utility product is for sale, and the aim is for
as many people as possible to buy it. This is not so with LTC insurance, which is not sold indiscrimi-
nately. Rather, underwriters decide whether to accept a buyer's payment for insurance or to refuse
the potential buyer. This is a way of controlling risk. In addition, different classes of consumers may
be charged different rates. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 10 n.23.
70. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 10 n.24.
71. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 10-11 nn.25-26. In 1996 and 1997, the NDI, writ-
ing to Hanson defendants' LTC policy holders who had filed complaints based on premium increases,
noted that NDI shares "your frustration regarding this premium increase, but we find that our hands
are tied as well[,]..." because "[u]nfortunately, North Dakota Insurance laws and regulations do not
allow us to disapprove this rate increase."
72. In an analogous case, Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, the Supreme Court allowed a fraud action
under RICO to proceed despite the defendant insurance company's claim that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act precluded a RICO case in the face of state law "enacted for the purpose of regulating the busi-
ness of insurance because it would invalidate, impair or supersede" the Nevada insurance laws.
Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 307, 314 (1999). The key issue before the Court was whether
RICO's application would "impair" Nevada's law. Id. at 307. The court found that Nevada had a
comprehensive administrative scheme prohibiting various forms of insurance fraud and misrepresen-
tation and giving the Nevada Insurance Commissioner the authority to issue charges if there was
reason to believe the Act had been violated, to issue cease and desist orders, and to administer fees.
Id. at 311-12. The court also found that Nevada allowed private actions for violations of insurance
practices, including misrepresentations of pertinent facts and tort actions for breach of the common
law duty to deal with insureds in good faith. Id. at 312. However, despite the comprehensive scheme
and other remedies available, the court found that allowing a RICO fraud action would not frustrate
the Nevada policy at issue but would rather complement Nevada's statutory and common law claims
for relief. Id. at 311-14.
73. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); United States Navigation
Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922);
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co, 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992); N.C.
Steel, Inc. v. National Council on Compensation Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369 (1998).
74. H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 488; see also N.C. Steel,. Inc., 496 S.E.2d at 373 (finding that a
"comprehensive regulatory scheme of administrative restitution" constitutes "a remedy for injured
ratepayers").
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Even the plaintiffs in the first filed rate doctrine case had a damage
remedy under the Interstate Commerce Act. 75 In his seminal Judicial
Control of Administrative Action, Professor Louis L. Jaffee describes the
Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. 76 case: "The usual pri-
vate antitrust remedy is damages and when the damages alleged closely
parallel the reparations which an agency can award for injuries growing
out of the regulatory statute, the reasoning of [United States Navigation
Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co.] 7 7 is potentially applicable to block the
antitrust suit." 78
In Cunard, cited by Jaffee above, the Court held that the remedies
of the Shipping Act superseded those of the antitrust laws. 79 The key
point was that at least one remedy must be available before a second
remedy is effectively nullified. 80 This point is made eloquently in
Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,81 in which the Court allowed
Georgia to sue on behalf of itself and as parens patriae under antitrust
law, stating "repeals by implication are not favored. Only a clear
repugnancy between the old law and the new results in the former giving
way and then only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy." 82
Unlike the situation in the above cases, most state insurance depart-
ments do not have the power to award damages. Recently, the Eighth
Circuit in Calico Trailer Manufacturing Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America 83 underscored the significance of this fact by ruling that the
court would not consider the applicability of the filed rate doctrine to a
diversity case challenging increases in workers' compensation rates
because the appellant had refused to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to worker's compensation insureds under Arkansas law. 84
As discussed earlier, the NDI does not have a formal administrative
procedure for the review of a requested LTC insurance premium in-
crease to allow public hearings, or an administrative vehicle for the award
75. Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922).
76. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
77. 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
78. Louis L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 143 (Abridged Student ed.
1965).
79. United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474,485 (1932).
80. See id.
81. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
82. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945).
83. 155 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 1998).
84. Calico Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 155 F.3d 976, 978 (8th Cir. 1998) (quot-
ing Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993) ("Where relief is available from an administrative
agency, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to pursue that avenue of redress before proceeding to the
courts")); see also Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co. v. James, 506 S.E.2d 892 (Ga. App. 1998), cert.
denied, (Jan. 15, 1999); Howard R. Rubin, Reiter v. Cooper and Unreasonable Rates: Are Reports of
the Filed Rate Doctrine's Death Greatly Exaggerated, 42 DUKE L.J. 905, 927-30 (1993) (discussing
primary jurisdiction concerns and the role of the judiciary and administrative agencies).
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of compensatory damages. Yet, the insurance company can appeal the
decision to the state district court for administrative review.8 5 Some
courts have held that deference to administrative agencies with respect to
initial decisions on matters within the expertise of the agency are within
the sound discretion of the trial court.8 6 The North Dakota Supreme
Court has held that the decision of an administrative agency is to be
accorded "great deference," and the court will not make independent
findings of fact or substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.87
Instead, the court's role is to determine whether a reasonable mind could
have reasonably concluded the facts or conclusions were supported by
the weight of the evidence.8 8 However, under the circumstances of this
case, the only decision NDI is authorized to make is whether or not the
insurance company has met the requisite sixty percent loss ratio neces-
sary to justify a rate increase.
Moreover, to the extent North Dakota's insurance regime provides
NDI with authority, that authority is not used, because the efforts would
be futile. The NDI has not had a hearing or ruling on the denial of a
LTC rate increase. Moreover, NDI testimony in Hanson indicates that
even if it challenged the requested rate increase in an administrative hear-
ing, the insurance company would prevail.89
It is true that some other states, particularly New York, have applied
the filed rate doctrine to non-fraud rate claims in the insurance arena.90
Golomb v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States makes it
clear that New Yorkers have an alternative remedy:
However, this court held that the "filed rate" doctrine did not
prevent plaintiffs from asserting a claim, albeit not as a class
action, under Law §4226(a)(4), which prohibits misrepresenta-
tions of the financial condition of the insurer, since this statute
specifically provides for a penalty in the amount of the premi-
85. See, e.g., Insurance Servs. Office v. Knutson, 283 N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 1979); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Knutson, 278 N.W.2d 383, 391 (N.D. 1979) ("Allstate and the Commissioner apparently agreed that
the Insurance Commissioner's authority in reviewing a filing is limited, and that he, unlike other rate-
making authorities, cannot accept the filing in part and reject it in part"); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 188 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) ("we observe a legislative deficiency upon
the subject of regulating insurance rates by not allowing some flexibility on the part of the Insurance
Commissioner to review filings").
86. See, e.g., Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So. 2d 475, 489 (La. 1991)
(Marcus, J., dissenting).
87. Seela v. Moore, 603 N.W.2d 480 (N.D. 1999).
88. Id.
89. See supra note 64.
90. Golomb v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, No. 101510/95, slip op at 8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 1996).
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ums paid. Thus, there was no need to recalculate the approved
rates. However, no such claims are asserted herein. 91
Further, the insurance laws of New York are significantly different from
North Dakota's insurance laws.
Insurance in New York is highly regulated by the Department of
Insurance, which is armed with much greater authority regarding rate
making decisions than the NDI. For example, the New York Insurance
Code sets standards for rates and instructs the superintendent to examine
certain criteria, including whether premiums are "excessive."92 To the
extent an insurer tries to plead losses on a single product, the super-
intendent may look at the profitability of the company as a whole. 93
The Code also provides for a consumers advisory council, as well as
a business advisory council to assist the superintendent's rate making
decisions. 94 The Code has a provision allowing an aggrieved person
access to information from the insurer (i.e., discovery) and a means of
being heard by the insurer.95 If the insurer refuses or rejects the per-
son's request, that person may file a request with the superintendent who
must hold a hearing. 96 The Code provides that if the superintendent
finds any rate filing in violation of these regulations or any rate filing
that is excessive, inadequate, or discriminatory, the superintendent may
order the filing withdrawn or suspended.97 The insurer may then request
a hearing at which the insurer bears the burden of justifying the rate.98
Following the hearing, if the superintendent finds the rate discriminatory,
he or she may order the insurer to remedy the rate.99 If the superinten-
dent finds the violation to be willful, he or she may, in addition to any
91. Id. at 7.
92. N.Y. INS. LAW § 2303 (Supp. 1999-2000).
93. Id. The Code states:
Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory, destructive of
competition or detrimental to the solvency of insurers. In determining whether rates
comply with the foregoing standards, the superintendent shall include all income earned
by such insurer and any insurer controlling or controlled by such insurer or under
common control by or with such insurer on all its investments of any kind and wherever
located. The superintendent shall further determine whether any component of such
rates represent an effort on the part of the insurer to recover losses incurred in another
state due to any referendum, law or regulation which requires a general reduction in
rates for the kinds of insurance described in section two thousand three hundred two of
this article. Such a finding shall be deemed unfairly discriminatory for the purposes of
this article.
Id.
94. N.Y. INS. LAW § 2341 (Supp. 1999-2000).
95. N.Y. INs. LAW § 2319 (Supp. 1999-2000).
96. Id.
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other penalty provided by law, assess a penalty on the insurer on behalf
of the people of New York.lOO After a final determination against an
insurer, any person so entitled may demand that the amount of over-
charges received during the pendency of the hearing, together with
interest, be refunded.lOl
Finally, the Code contains a "default" penalty provision for in-
stances in which the Code is willfully violated but for which no other
section of the chapter imposes a penalty.f 02 This section also states that
the superintendent may maintain a civil action in the name of the people
to recover a judgment for a monetary penalty imposed by the Code. In
other words, there is an alternative compensatory remedy in New York.
This brief overview of the Insurance Code of New York shows that
the New York legislature designed an insurance agency with regulatory
and enforcement authority and safeguards for consumer protection.
Thus, New York courts are justified in applying the filed rate doctrine
and deferring to the Insurance Department. 103 As discussed above, the
same is not true for NDI.
The North Dakota Legislature has deliberately chosen not to enact a
comprehensive regulatory scheme like that of New York. The NDI has
no teeth in its regulations, and it cannot provide compensation to victims
of insurance fraud. Rather, if a citizen of North Dakota has a dispute
with an insurance company, he or she must handle the dispute individual-
ly in a court of law as envisioned by article I, section 9 of the North
Dakota Constitution0 4 and section 26.1-04-18 of the North Dakota
Century Code.105 Significantly, the differences between the relatively
weaker North Dakota insurance laws and the relatively stricter New York
laws were identified in Hanson discovery as a reason why the defendants
chose to market these experimental policies in North Dakota, but not in
New York. 106
100. Id.
101. NY INS. LAw § 2322 (Supp. 1999-2000).
102. NY INS. LAW § 109 (Supp. 1999-2000).
103. While New York does apply the filed rate doctrine to rate cases, it construes the doctrine
narrowly, allowing for state law fraud actions against insurers. See Dornberger v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the entitlement of an insured to seek rescission
of an insurance policy based on fraud is well established).
104. N.D. CoNsT. art I, § 9. Article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution provides as
follows: "All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person
or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in such manner, in such courts, and in such
cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law, direct." id.
105. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-18 (1995) ("An order of the commissioner under this chapter or
order of a court affirming the commissioner's order does not relieve or absolve any person affected
by the order from any liability under any other law of this state"); see also discussion infra Part III.C.
106. Deposition of Paul Barnhart, Vol. 1, at 147-48 (November 19, 1988)
A: I think it would depend. Some states are very loose on this. They'll look at it and
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NDI's lack of review and enforcement abilities is not unique to
North Dakota. The Supreme Court of Alabama in Life Insurance Co. of
Georgia v. Johnson,107 a case involving an elderly woman who had been
sold worthless Medicare supplement insurance, explained that "Alabama
citizens who become the victims of fraud have little recourse other than
through litigation. The record in this case is replete with expert testi-
mony to the effect that the State Insurance Department has little power to
regulate agents and we judicially know that litigation is often the only
weapon defrauded citizens have." 108 Other courts have recognized that
their respective state insurance departments likewise have no authority to
award damages. 109 This factor, when present, counsels against applica-
tion of the filed rate doctrine.
3. Meaningful Review
The Ninth Circuit in Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. 110 held that
the filed rate doctrine would not bar a class action suit brought by
Arizona and Wisconsin consumers against title insurance companies for
antitrust violations.Il' The Ninth Circuit held that the fact that the title
insurance companies had filed rates did not prevent litigation:
The absence of meaningful state review allows the insurers to
file any rates they want. Therefore, the act of filing does not
legitimize a rate arrived at by improper action. The regulations
of Arizona and Wisconsin require only "non-disapproval of
the rates and do not require compliance with strict guidelines
such as those set forth under the ICC regulations.""l 2
file it. And other states will really dig into. An example, like New York, if you are filing
something in New York, it's going to be looked over pretty dam carefully. That's the
case with the larger states. Some of the states with low population like North Dakota and
some of those, they are not as-
Q: Strict?
A: They're not as strict, really. And partly, I think, because they might not have
enough manpower, you know, with them to handle it in a small state, small population
state.
Id.
107. 684 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 1996).
108. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685, 693 (Ala. 1996).
109. See Shernoff v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. Rptr. 680, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that the
California Insurance Commissioner had no implied power to award money judgments in favor of
victims of insurance deceptive trade practices when statute limited his or her authority to injunctive
relief); Sheeran v. Progressive Life Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 469, 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)
(finding that the New Jersey Commissioner had no implied power to award restitution to victims of
unfair settlement claim practices); see also Great Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1234 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding that the New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt the analysis in Sheeran).
110. 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).
111. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1992).
112. Id. at 394.
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NDI's "review" of requests for increases in premiums for long term
care policies is theoretical only, and it pales in comparison to the review
proscribed by statute in statutory schemes such as that of New York.113
North Dakota's loss ratio scheme for premiums and rate increases
can be manipulated or can mask defendants' own fault. In Hanson,
there were ways to avoid or minimize the rate increases incurred by the
North Dakota policyholders, but the Hanson defendants did not imple-
ment them with respect to the policy forms at issue.114 Specifically, the
defendants almost concurrently developed different LTC policies, the
Form 532 and 1000 series, which were priced higher but were not
marketed or sold in North Dakota.115 These LTC policies never suffered
a rate increase.1 16 Moreover, the defendants' consulting actuary pro-
posed in 1991 that the existing 520, 521, and 522 policies be rewritten as
532 policies to avoid rate increases.117 In addition, at that point, Acceler-
ation, which after the assumption by Commonwealth Life Insurance
Company ("Commonwealth") retained only the Ohio business, pooled
its Ohio policies with other LTC policies to stabilize the block and avoid
rate increases.118 Commonwealth, which has other North Dakota LTC
policies to offer via its corporate parent Aegon, has not sought to pool
this block of business. 119 Commonwealth also declined other available
options such as converting the policies or rewriting the policies.120
Instead, it elected to continue administering the defective Forms 520,
521 and 522 policies, increasing rates annually.121 Thus, the filed rate
doctrine's application under these circumstances is not warranted.
Further, in determining whether the filed rate doctrine applies to
insurance cases in North Dakota, courts should give deference to NDI's
interpretation of its authority.122 Statements from Commissioner of
113. See, e.g., Byan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 662 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Minihane v.
Weissman , 640 N.Y.S.2d 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); see also Ashy Brokerage, Inc. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 637 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (recognizing the primary jurisdiction of the NYAIP and the
Insurance Commissioner).
114. See generally Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 24, at 7-8.
115. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 24, at 7.
116. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 7 n.17.
117. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 7-8.
118. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 24, at 8.
119. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 24, at 8.
120. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 24, at 8.
121. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 24, at 8.
122. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.
See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Further, the Court has consistently
followed the principal of deference to administrative interpretations whenever a decision as to the
meaning or reach of a statue has involved reconciling conflicting policies and a full understanding of
the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary
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Insurance Glenn Pomeroy and Senior Life and Health Rate Forms
Analyst Vance Magnuson indicate the Department of Insurance is virtual-
ly powerless to prohibit increases in premiums.123 For example, Commis-
sioner Pomeroy testified before a North Dakota Senate Committee as
follows:
Nothing is more frustrating to an insurance regulator as having
no choice other than to approve a large premium increase ....
State law requires the Insurance Department to approve premi-
um increases that are shown to be necessary to pay claims by
the companies .... Present law doesn't allow the Department
any alternative other than to approve these increases. 124
The Commissioner further addressed the regulation problem in a
letter dated January 27, 1997, sent to the North Dakota House of Repre-
sentatives in support of HB 1419, which sought to stabilize rates of LTC
insurance. 125 The letter stated in part as follows:
Currently, state law allows long term care insurance companies
selling in North Dakota to increase the rates charged to their
policy holders whenever they can demonstrate they need more
in premiums to pay the claims they are incurring. State law
does not establish any ground rules up front when the compa-
ny first files the product, and so the company knows that
regardless of where they price the product originally, they will
be able to jack up the rates charged to their existing policy
holders at any time during the life of the policy. 126
A prime example of that to which Commissioner Pomeroy referred
in the above statement is found in Hanson. By 1987, the Hanson de-
fendants and their consulting actuary saw the need for premium rate
increases and recomputed the actuarial assumptions underlying these
policies.127 Specifically, immediately before the big sales push in North
Dakota, during which consumers were told their premiums would be
X,128 the defendants knew that the premiums would be raised to at least
knowledge respecting matters subject to agency regulation. Id.; see also Delorme v. North Dakota
Dep't of Human Servs., 492 N.W.2d 585, 587 (N.D. 1992).
123. See generally Senate Industry, Business and Labor Committee on Senate Bill No. 2161, 54th
Legis. (North Dakota 1995) (statement of Glenn Pomeroy, Insurance Commissioner); Deposition of
Vance Magnuson (Sept. 22, 1998).
124. Senate Industry, Business and Labor Committee on Senate Bill No. 2161, 54th Legis. 3
(North Dakota 1995) (statement of Glenn Pomeroy, Insurance Commissioner).
125. Letter from Glenn Pomeroy, North Dakota Insurance Commissioner, to North Dakota
House of Representatives (Jan. 27, 1997) (on file with author).
126. Id.
127. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 9.
128. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 9. The average policy price was about $1000,
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X + 20% in the first year, with more increases to follow.129 Due to the
initial low price of the policies and the poor underwriting, discussed
above, the Hanson defendants knew they could easily meet the sixty
percent loss-ratio requirement justifying these rate increases. 130
To prevent this sort of fraudulent scheme from leading to price
increases in the future, the NDI actuary, Tom Foley, who assists
Pomeroy's legislative efforts, believes that the fixed loss ratio concept
used in North Dakota for determining initial and renewal premiums (the
60% figure) must be legislatively eliminated. The testimony of Commis-
sioner Pomeroy also supports a decision not to apply the filed rate
doctrine to LTC insurance matters in North Dakota because of the lack
of the Insurance Department's authority to reject rate increases. The
indisputable evidence is that NDI has not interpreted its authority, and
cannot do so, to give it the power of the New York Department of
Insurance, or even the power of a ratemaking agency like the North
Dakota PSC. Rather, the NDI acknowledges that it must accept and
approve rates that meet certain statutory requirements related to a sixty
percent loss-ratio, i.e., sixty percent of premium dollars must go to pay
benefits over the projected life of a policy. The filed rate doctrine has
never been applied where the relevant agency has denied having the
power to stop rate increases.
4. Damages Not Based Upon Difference Between the Filed
Rate and the Rate That Should Have Been Charged
The Eighth Circuit in H.J. Inc. explained that "[t]he filed rate doc-
trine prohibits a party from recovering damages measured by comparing
the filed rate doctrine and the rate that might have been approved absent
the conduct in issue." 131 Because the responsible agency had reviewed
the rate, found that it was "tainted," and ordered a prospective rate de-
crease and refund, the Court ruled that the filed rate doctrine barred the
RICO action. 132 Other courts have also recognized that the filed rate
doctrine prohibits a court from calculating damages based upon a
reasonable rate absent fraud. 133
subject to one of six variations of coverage that altered the price slightly. Specifically, all policies
were either 0-day elimination (coverage begins with claim) or 100 day elimination (insured not paid
for first 100 days). Under either type, an insured could select one of three levels of maximum
coverage, i.e., $40, $60 or $80 per day. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 9.
129. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 9.
130. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 9.
131. H.J Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 488 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S.
957 (1992).
132. Id. at 495-96.
133. See, e.g., Marcus v. AT&T Co., 138 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1998); Wegoland Ltu. v. NYNEX
Corp. 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1994); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1494 (11th Cir. 1993) (en
banc).
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However, courts have distinguished cases involving non-rate related
issues, such as suitability, poor marketing practices, and fraudulent in-
ducement.134 This "rate v. non-rate" distinction is seen in numerous
insurance fraud cases, such as the use of misleading projections in "van-
ishing premium" insurance litigation, which do not apply the filed rate
doctrine. 135
In Florida Municipal Power Agency v. Florida Power & Light
Co.,136 the Eleventh Circuit explained that a factual issue remained as to
whether the filed rate covered the network service that the plaintiff
sought to buy and remanded to the lower court with instructions that if
the court concluded that the services were distinct, it could estimate the
rate that would have been in effect but for the violation.137 The court
also noted that the United States filed an amicus brief which suggested
that "[d]epending on the circumstances, the court also could have
considered a primary jurisdiction referral to the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission in connection with this issue." 138 Clearly, the NDI has
no such primary jurisdiction to decide a reasonable rate.
The Hanson plaintiffs sought the return of premiums they paid
defendants for long-term care insurance policies they purchased based
upon reasonable expectations of a reliable, affordable insurance product
that would provide financial protection to them in their old age in the
event they needed nursing home care, i.e., fraud damages. The Hanson
defendants never communicated to plaintiffs, either at the time of
purchase or annually upon renewal, that there were problems with the
policies that the plaintiffs purchased which impacted the value of the
policies.139 Such suitability issues are wholly distinguishable from rate
issues and should not implicate the filed rate doctrine.140
134. See H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 490 (citing Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 824
F.2d 1465, 1471-72 (5th Cir. 1987), for the premise that setting aside contracts because of fraud in the
inducement would not interfere with agency rate-making authority); see also Nordlicht v. New York
Tel. Co., 617 F. Supp. 220, 227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that the filed rate doctrine "is of no help to
a defendant which fraudulently induces a plaintiff to pay a filed rate ... by fraud").
135. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 525
(D.N.J. 1997) (discussing the vanishing premium, improper replacement ("churning"), and deceptive
investment scheme claims); see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d
283 (3d Cir. 1998); Dickerson v. Central Life Ins. Co., 932 F. Supp. 1471 (M.D. Ga. 1996); Duhamine
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 96-10706-GAO (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 19 "). As these
cases illustrate, insurers are often sued for fraud and bad faith.
136. 64 F.3d 614 (1 lth Cir. 1995).
137. Florida Mun. Power Agency v. Florida Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 614,615 (11 th Cir. 1995).
138. Id. at 616.
139. See generally Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 24, at 9-10.
140. Fraud claims related to suitability can be divided into two broad categories, general suitabili-
ty and specific suitability. In general suitability cases, the product is alleged to be a bad product,
unsuitable for any customer or any customer within a class. See, e.g., Hanson v. Acceleration Life
Ins. Co., No. A3-97-152 (D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999). In specific suitability cases, the product is alleged to
be unsuitable only because of the objectives means and needs of the particular customer. See, e.g.,
[VOL. 76:1
2000] FILED RATE DOCTRINE AND INSURANCE FRAUD LITIGATION 21
In fact, Thomas Smith, the Hanson defendants' own expert and
author of an amicus curiae brief in Hanson concerning the applicability
of the filed rate doctrine, confirmed this.141 Smith, a North Dakota
attorney, was hired by the Hanson defendants to provide expert testimo-
ny primarily concerning North Dakota's regulation of LTC insurance.
During his deposition, Smith testified that North Dakota law allows a
consumer policyholder to sue an insurance company for fraud and
fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract.14 2 Hanson class counsel
then posed a series of hypothetical situations to Smith, asking him to
opine whether the filed rate doctrine would bar the hypothetical claims.
Portions of Smith's deposition testimony follow:
Q. (By Mr. Kanner). Let me ask you a hypothetical ques-
tion. If somebody bought an insurance policy, and let's
assume for purposes of my hypothetical that there was a
fraudulent inducement, they thought it would provide some
benefit that, in fact, it didn't, and that person had that unfortu-
nate event occur and he or she sued for, say, the medical costs
that weren't covered under the policy, sort of like some of
those women that-older people that you protected, they
thought they were getting some type of coverage and, in fact,
they weren't getting it under the policy, could that person sue
Young v. Ray Brandt Dodge, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 230 (E.D. La. 1997).
141. Smith authored an amicus brief for the American Council of Life Insurance on behalf of the
Hanson defendants. See generally Amicus Brief of American Council of Life Insurance Regarding
the Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine, Hanson v. Accelerated Life Ins. Co., No. A3-97-152
(D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999). In its brief, the amicus cited Allstate Insurance Co. v. Knutson, for support of
defendants' contention that the North Dakota Supreme Court would recognize and apply the filed rate
doctrine. See id. at 15 (citing Allstate Insurance Co. v. Knutson, 278 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1979).
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in reviewing the conduct of the insurance commis-
sioner in a rate approval case, observed that, in reviewing findings of any administrative
agency, the court must exercise restraint, and should not substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the administrative agency, because of the constitutional prohibition involved
in the doctrine of the separation of powers against a delegation of nonjudicial functions
to the judiciary.
Id. That case involved an appeal by the Insurance Commissioner regarding a rate decision. Allstate
had applied for a rate increase, which the Commissioner denied. The district court reversed the Com-
missioner's decision and remanded to the Commissioner for him to enter an order approving the rate.
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. Thus, despite the general rule
that courts should defer to administrative agencies, the court in this case reversed the Commissioner's
decision.
142. Deposition of Thomas Smith, at 17-18 (Aug. 4, 1999).
Q. You agree that under North Dakota's Century Code, you can sue an insurance-a
consumer policyholder can sue an insurance company for fraud, correct?
A. Yes.
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for damages the amount of the medical bills and the coverage
that they needed to pay?
A. Could they sue for the damages that were for medical care
that was represented to them that was covered and it was not, is
that what your question is? It's an element of damage, yes.
Q. Yes, they could?
A. Yes, sure. 143
Q. All right. And let's assume that somebody claims they
bought the policy, and then when they figured out this wasn't
the suitable policy for them, they lapsed and then they had to
go into a nursing home, and let's say their coverage was
120,000. Would that person be entitled to not the money back,
but the $120,000 in the nursing home that they thought they
were buying?
THE WITNESS: And they let it lapse for what reason?
Q. They determined that they had been fraudulently induced,
they thought that it would be affordable until they needed it,
turned out not to be affordable, they let it lapse, they figured it
out, whatever reason?
A. I think it's a potential element of damages that can be
recovered, yes, based upon that misrepresentation.144
Q. Okay. Now, people in North Dakota who let a contract of
insurance lapse because they have let it lapse, they couldn't sue
for rescission, correct, or not?
THE WITNESS: If they let it lapse, if there's fraud and
material misrepresentation at the time that they entered into the
contract?
Q. Yes.
A. And the contract didn't turn out to be, yeah, I think they
could still possibly sue even after they let it lapse.
Q. For rescission?
A. Yeah, for return of the premiums, yeah.
Q. Okay. So if somebody sued for rescission arguing
fraudulent inducement, they could sue and part of the remedy
would properly be a return of the premiums under North
Dakota law?
143. Id. at 63-64 (objections and clarifications omitted).
144. Id. at 65-66 (objections and clarifications omitted).
[VOL. 76:1
2000] FILED RATE DOCTRINE AND INSURANCE FRAUD LITIGATIOi 23
THE WITNESS: Well, I think that's a possibility, depending
upon the facts, yeah. 145
Q. (By Mr. Kanner) Okay. Assuming a jury returns a
verdict on fraudulent inducement, would you agree that the
Filed Rate Doctrine does not prohibit recovery of nursing
home costs, correct?
A. I think that's a possibility, yes.
Q. Okay. What if somebody had to switch-What if instead
of going into a nursing home, that person was able to buy new
coverage at a much higher premium, and they felt that because
they had aged, you know, during the years of coverage and
they were in a higher risk group, would that person have a
cause of action, at least for the difference that they're paying
to their new insurance carrier, assuming that they were able to
find one?
A. If there was a fraudulent misrepresentation at the time that
the contract was entered into, I think that's a possibility.
Q. Yes, okay. In each of my questions I've asked if there was
fraudulent inducement at the time of the initial sale of the
contract. I want to ask the same questions, but with respect to
the renewal of the contract. I want you to assume there wasn't
fraudulent inducement at the time the contract was originally
sold, okay?
A. Okay.
Q. Under this hypo there was no fraudulent inducement in
1984 when a contract of insurance was sold, okay, but let's
assume that in the renewal process, say 1986, the company
learned something material that under North Dakota law they
needed to disclose to the customer and they failed to do it, and
a jury returned a verdict that said "We find that the renewal
from that year forward was based on fraudulent inducement
caused by this material omission of fact," would you agree that
if that person then ended up in a nursing home or then ended
up having to buy a different insurance policy, that that person
could sue for those damages without running afoul of your
definition of the Filed Rate Doctrine?
Q. Right. I'm asking you to assume for purposes of the
hypothetical that the jury renders that decision, again, I'm not
145. Id. at 66-67 (objections and clarifications omitted).
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asking you to agree that it's a just or appropriate decision,
okay, but would your analysis then be the same whether it was
fraud in the inducement at the time of sale or fraud in the
inducement at the time of the renewal with respect to your
analysis of damages?
A. You could use the same ground, yeah, using those
assumptions. 146
Q. And you'd agree with me that a certain percentage of
North Dakotans are going to buy long-term care and want to
keep it for the rest of their lives, correct?
A. I think that's a fair statement.
Q. Okay. And that's an assumption these companies make
when they start marketing these products, they don't know
whether it's Tom Smith or John Smith that's going to buy it,
but they know statistically a certain number of people are
concerned about the risks of growing old in America and
perhaps ending up in a nursing home, correct?
A. Okay.
Q. Now, for purposes of my hypothetical, I just want you to
assume that we're talking about people who, all other things
being equal, would choose to keep nursing care coverage for
the rest of their lives, all right?
A. Okay.
Q. With respect to that subgroup of the overall American
population, or North Dakota population, would you agree that
they should only buy a policy that would be affordable for the
rest of their lives?
THE WITNESS: Well, I think they'd want to buy a policy
that's only affordable for the rest of their lives, yeah.
Q. Okay. And so isn't the assumption made by both the
insurance company and the consumer that even if rates may go
up, they won't go up to the point of being unaffordable?
THE WITNESS: Well, I would think that would be every-
body's, you know, best effort as far as that type of a contract,
yeah.
Q. Let's assume you have an insurance company, it's
licensed, and the owner decides that he's going to sell a new
product, a long-term care product, and without telling anyone
else, he prices it wrong, okay, knows that it can never function
146. Id. at 69-72 (objections and clarifications omitted).
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as a long-term care policy, takes people's money and flees
before any claims are made, okay, would you agree that those
people under North Dakota law could sue for fraud and get
their money back?
Q. Okay. And even though they want their money back, you
would not bar that suit under the Filed Rate Doctrine, that
particular suit, correct?
A. Well, if he committed fraud at the inception, no.
Q. Okay. And that would be true even if he had filed the
policy specimen with the Department and with the rate and the
rate was approved, it was stamped filed and approved, and a
copy of that was sitting in the Insurance Department file,
correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. Now, let's assume that we have the same hypotheti-
cal with one exception, okay, fellow gets a long-term care
policy, gets the specimen, files it, stamped filed and approved
by the Department of North Dakota, he then begins through
agents to sell the product, okay? He knows and plans and
anticipates that he's going to shift the risk of any loss back to
the customers and he knows he's going to need a bunch of rate
increases, he's not going to go in for, you know, 100 percent,
200 percent at once, but he's planning on increasing the
premiums at the time he's selling it, okay? Now, you would
agree that that's fraudulent? Let's say this is a company that
he figures he's just going to sell, and he figures the best way to
sell is just to underprice the competitors and give big commis-
sions to agents, okay, well-thought-out scheme, and he sells this
stuff and he's planning on going in for future rate increases.
Now, my question is: Before he goes in for future rate increas-
es, would you agree that people could sue for fraud and either
assume the contract, get back their premiums and/or whatever
damages they had?
A. You could establish the fraud at the time whenever the
fraud occurred, yeah.
Q. And that that wouldn't be barred by the Filed Rate Doc-
trine, correct?
A. Well, if there's fraud-You know he has a fraudulent
scheme of some type from day one, I mean, you know, and
there is concealment and that's relied upon by the policyhold-
er, you know.
Q. Then yes, you could sue for fraud?
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A. Yeah. There's always that possibility that you could
rescind the contract.
Q. That particular fraud would not be barred by the Filed
Rate Doctrine, correct?
A. Yeah, he could rescind the contract.
Q. Okay. Now, let's take that exact same hypothetical again
and they begin raising rates, okay, he has priced the policy
very, very low, okay, and he raises rates and he knows more
rate increases are going to occur and people, while old who
have bought the policy may still have a chance to go get a
decent policy, but he sends them letters that contain false
representations about the quality of his insurance product.
Would those people under that fact scenario be able to sue, get
their premiums back and any possible damages?
A. If there's fraud permeating the whole situation, yeah.
Q. Okay. And they could sue and there would be no Filed
Rate Doctrine issue, as you understand it, correct?
A. Right.
Q. I want to vary that hypothetical. Let's assume at the
inception of the contract the fellow who's selling the insurance
decides he wants to underprice the market. He has no idea how
this thing is going to perform, okay, but he certainly knows
that if his pricing assumptions are wrong it could be very
disastrous, okay, so he doesn't have a specific intent to defraud,
but he certainly is knowingly underpricing the product for the
sole purpose of maximizing sales and short-term returns, okay?
Subsequently, he finds out that he's going to need massive rate
increases to stabilize the block of business, right? At that time
of renewal, and perhaps the first rate increase he sends a letter
to people and makes material misrepresentations about the
quality of the insurance product. Under that hypothetical,
would you be allowed to maintain an action for fraud without
the Filed Rate Doctrine as a bar under your theory?
Q. That could be fraud not barred by the Filed Rate
Doctrine?
THE WITNESS: Possible, yes.147
147. Id. at 84-95 (objections and clarifications omitted).
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Thus, even according to the Hanson defendants' own expert, the filed
rate doctrine is inapplicable in most, if not all, insurance cases in North
Dakota. 14 8
B. THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT BELONG IN LONG TERM
CARE INSURANCE CASES
The filed rate doctrine most often applies to entities which operate
as a monopoly, as is the case with most public utilities, because in the
absence of competition, the rate payer has no legal right to pay any
other rate. 149
The filed rate doctrine has only been applied to insurance when the
insurance product at issue is not a specific insurance policy challenged
by policyholders, as in Hanson. For example, a federal district judge in
Morales v. Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund'50 applied the filed rate
doctrine to bar federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)
claims because all title insurance companies in Florida were legally re-
quired to charge a fixed rate. 151 North Dakota does not mandate a
single rate for LTC insurance. Additionally, the Morales court refused
to apply the filed rate doctrine to the state claims for fraudulent misrep-
resentation, negligent misrepresentation and violations of the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practice Act.152
A state-created workers' compensation insurance monopoly was
challenged in N.C. Steel, Inc. v. National Council on Compensation
Insurance.153 Several employers alleged antitrust violations by the pool
of workers' compensation carriers, which they alleged resulted in higher
premiums.154 The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the filed
rate doctrine precluded the suit and explained that the North Carolina
General Statutes contained a comprehensive regulatory scheme which
punished violators and provided for appeals from the Insurance Commis-
sioner's decisions.155
However, there is no such approved insurance monopoly or oligop-
oly in North Dakota. Anyone who qualifies can be involved in the
insurance business in North Dakota, as North Dakota has no quote or
148. Id. at 63-95.
149. See Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922) (stating that an "injury implies
violation of a legal right").
150. 983 F. Supp. 1418 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
151. Morales v. Attorneys' Title Ins. Fund, 983 F. Supp. 1418, 1429 (S. D. Fla. 1997).
152. Id. at 1430.
153. 496 S.E.2d 369 (1998).
154. N.C. Steel, Inc. v. National Council on Compensation Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 371-72 (1998).
155. Id. at 372.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
restrictions. This makes the filed rate doctrine inappropriate for insur-
ance in North Dakota.
C. THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE HAS NEVER BEEN APPLIED IN THE FACE
OF AN EXPRESs SAVINGS CLAUSE
Since the filed rate doctrine applied to the ICC, it obviously applies
in the federal regulatory context. A consequence of applying the filed
rate doctrine is the loss of an individual's ability to obtain redress in a
court of law. As pointed out in Keogh, there was an administrative
remedy available in absence of a civil remedy.1 56 However, since the
federal constitution does not provide for an express right to sue in
federal court, discussion of an administrative remedy was arguably
unnecessary, and there was likewise no need to consider whether the
administrative remedy provided an adequate alternative to such a litiga-
tion right. However, a different analysis governs the application of the
filed rate doctrine under state law.
When the filed rate doctrine is invoked in a case involving state law,
state constitutional problems may arise when the citizens of a state have a
constitutionally protected right to a remedy under the law. Each state
court must consider a given legislatively created administrative scheme
against its own constitutional backdrop.
Article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy
by due process of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the
state in such manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the
legislative assembly may, by law, direct.157
Thus, the people of the state of North Dakota constitutionally reserved to
themselves a remedy under the law for any wrong done to any person.158
Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that article I,
section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution "plainly guarantees" an
"important substantive right."159
The remedy contemplated by article I, section 9 is usually in the
context of a citizen's right to bring a civil action against a tortfeasor.
156. Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922).
157. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9.
158. See id.
159. Bulman v. Hulstrand Const. Co. Inc., 521 N.W.2d 632, 637 (N.D. 1994) (interpreting article
I, section 9, of the North Dakota Constitution).
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Occasionally, however, the legislature makes exceptions. For example,
in the workers' compensation arena, the North Dakota Legislature
enacted section 65-01-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, which
provides:
The state of North Dakota, exercising its police and sovereign
powers, declares that the prosperity of the state depends in a
large measure upon the well-being of its wage workers, and,
hence, for workers injured in hazardous employments, and for
their families and dependents, sure and certain relief is hereby
provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion
of every other remedy, proceeding, or compensation, except as
otherwise provided in this title, and to that end, all civil actions
and civil claims for relief for those personal injuries and all
jurisdiction of the courts of the state over those causes are
abolished except as is otherwise provided in this title. A civil
action or civil claim arising under this title, which is subject to
judicial review, must be reviewed solely on the merits of the
action or claim. This title may not be construed liberally on
behalf of any party to the action or claim. 160
Thus, while the North Dakota Supreme Court has also classified the right
to sue as an important substantive right, 161 in the context of workers'
compensation, the court found that injured workers give up the right to
sue in exchange for sure and certain administrative relief (i.e., compen-
satory damages), regardless of questions of fault.162 Consequently,
although the employee no longer has the right to sue, his constitutional
right to a remedy under the law, guaranteed by article I, section 9 of the
North Dakota Constitution, is maintained. Additionally, even in the
worker's compensation context where the legislature has taken away the
right to sue in exchange for the promise of "sure and certain" relief, the
law allows individuals to bring a private law suit against their employer
for intentional acts. 163
Numerous state courts have held that their respective "open courts"
provisions protect a citizen's constitutional right to sue. 164 For example,
160. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (emphasis added).
161. Haney v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195, 200 (N.D. 1994).
162. Id. at 200.
163. Zimmerman v. Vadak Corp., 570 N.W.2d 204, 207 (N.D. 1997) (holding that the defense of
"exclusive remedy" under the state workers' compensation system is not a defense when an
employee's lawsuit against his or her employer alleges an intentional tort).
164. See, e.g., Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1284 (Ind. 1999); Naugle v. Theard, 917
S.W.2d 287, 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
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a Utah court has stated that "to satisfy the open courts provision, the
Legislature cannot effectively preclude all compensation without provid-
ing an equivalent alternative remedy."165 A Texas court struck down a
statute of limitations provision as violating the open courts provision
finding that "[t]he open courts provision of our Constitution protects a
citizen, such as [plaintiff], from legislative acts that abridge his right to
sue before he has a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong and
bring suit."1 66 An Indiana court has also acknowledged the right of
access to the courts, stating:
[T]he legislature cannot unreasonably deny citizens the right to
exercise this right [of access, and] [s]imilarly, we have reasoned
that the legislature cannot deprive a person of a complete tort
remedy arbitrarily and unreasonably, consistent with the
protections Section 12 affords, and that legislation which
restricts such a right must be a rational means to achieve a
legitimate legislative goal.167
Moreover, it is clear that the North Dakota legislature expressly
intended to preserve the right to sue in the context of the state's insur-
ance regulations:
26.1-04-18. Order does not relieve from other liability.
An order of the commissioner under this chapter or order of a
court affirming the commissioner's order does not relieve or
absolve any person affected by the order from any liability
under any other law of this state. 168
This express reservation of rights reveals that the legislature understood
that constitutional rights to sue could not easily be usurped without an
alternative mechanism in place to award damages.
There is no remotely comparable legislative scheme providing for a
trade-off of benefits between the insurer and the insureds in North
Dakota. While the legislature provided for an administrative regime of
admittedly limited regulations for insurance companies, it did not pro-
vide for 'sure and certain relief' for insureds injured by the fraudulent
practices of the insurers in exchange for giving up the right to sue. In
fact, the legislature specifically included the aforementioned express pro-
vision in the insurance regulations reserving an individual's right to sue.
165. Wrolstad, 786 P.2d at 245.
166. Naugle, 917 S.W.2d at 292 (citations omitted).
167. Martin, 711 N.E.2d at 1284.
168. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-18 (1995).
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Consequently, an insured's right to a remedy under the law, guaranteed
in article I, section 9, of the North Dakota Constitution is protected. 169
D. THERE is No PRECEDENTIAL BASIS FOR APPLICATION OF THE FILED
RATE DOCTRINE IN NORTH DAKOTA
In O'Connor v. Northern States Power Co. , 7 0 the North Dakota
Supreme Court had an opportunity to apply the filed rate doctrine, but it
chose not to do so. 17 1 The court was faced with a lawsuit filed by
consumers alleging the Northern States Power Company ("NSP") was
charging impermissibly high rates. 172 In a prior administrative proceed-
ing of the PSC, NSP had filed an application for a rate increase. 173 The
PSC eventually issued an order allowing for a rate increase less than that
which NSP had requested. 174 In response, NSP filed a new application
for an even greater rate increase, which the PSC allowed to become
effective. 175 The rate payers then filed a procedurally unrelated suit in
state court seeking damages for the higher rates now being charged by
NSP. 176
Given these facts, the court could have pretermitted all issues raised
by the plaintiffs by applying the filed rate doctrine to the PSC's ruling.
Instead, the court did not discuss the filed rate doctrine, but entered into
a lengthy discussion of the PSC statutory scheme and ruled on the merits
of the case concluding that NSP lawfully charged the higher rate under
the statutory scheme and was therefore not liable for damages.177
In E.W. Wylie v. Menard, Inc. ,178 the North Dakota Supreme Court
recognized the existence of the filed rate doctrine under federal law in
the context of ICC regulation of common carriers. 179 This is a require-
ment of federalism and, in light of O'Connor, is no indication of what the
169. This is also the view of other states. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Prac-
tice Litig., 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998) (illustrating that private litigation is the primary watchdog that
wakes up state regulators). The Prudential court observed that Prudential's illegal activities first came
to light through private lawsuits filed in early 1994, which triggered a front-page news article. See
Lastly Schism, Fine Print Victims: Some Agents 'Churn' Life Insurance Policies, Hurt Their Custom-
ers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1995, at 1. In April 1995, more than a year after the first private suit, the
Multi-State Life Insurance Task Force was formed. Id. Prudential shows that private claims for relief
are absolutely crucial to ensure that victims of insurance fraud receive restitution. Id.
170. 308 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1981).
171. See generally O'Connor v. Northern States Power Co., 308 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1981).





177. Id. at 368-71.
178. 523 N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 1994).
179. See generally E.W Wylie Corp. v. Menard, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 1994).
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court would do in an insurance case. As previously noted, the filed rate
doctrine was established by the United States Supreme Court to preserve
the rate making authority of the ICC and to prevent interstate carriers
from engaging in price discrimination. Consequently, E.W. Wylie has no
bearing on this case. In fact, the court determined the carrier at issue was
a motor contract carrier, bound by contract, as opposed to a motor
common carrier, and found the filed rate doctrine had no application.80
The O'Connor case, in particular, presents a significant indication
that the North Dakota Supreme Court would not apply the filed rate
doctrine to a LTC insurance case if it refused to apply the doctrine to
rates set by the powerful PSC in the highly regulated utility industry.
Nor is there a legislative expression indicating an intent that North
Dakota should apply the filed rate doctrine to LTC insurance rates, or to
any insurance matter. Finally, there is no North Dakota Supreme Court
case or lower court case applying the filed rate doctrine to LTC
insurance cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the above discussion, the filed rate doctrine
does not belong in fraud-based insurance cases, such as Hanson. This is
particularly true in light of the current insurance regulatory scheme in
North Dakota. Society imposes on all its members certain norms of be-
havior so that others will not be injured. If those norms are violated,
society shifts the losses from the injured party to the party at fault.
Injured consumers should be permitted to seek redress for the damages
incurred from tortious and/or illegal acts of insurance companies,
without being met with the technical defense of the filed rate doctrine.
180. Id. at 403.
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